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ARE WE THERE YET?
FORTY YEARS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT:
REVOLUTION IN THE WORKFORCE
AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISES
THAT REMAIN
Thomas H. Barnard*and Adrienne L. Rapp**

INTRODUCTION

As recently as forty years ago, classified advertisements were
commonly limited to "whites only," "men only," or those that announced: "no blacks need apply." In just one generation, demands for
greater equality in workplace relations have resulted in a remarkable legislative response, placing the power of the law behind the mission for
social justice. As a consequence, many of the overtly discriminatory em-

ployment practices that operated to stigmatize and marginalize minority
groups have waned in the recent decades.
Anti-discrimination legislation has played an essential role in the
struggle to end occupational segregation and minority exclusion from

the workforce. The most significant anti-discrimination legislation to
emerge from this era is Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.' The pas* Thomas H. Barnard is the Chair of the Employment and Labor Group at Ulmer & Berne LLP and
served as past-Chair of the Labor & Employment Law Section of the Ohio State Bar Association.
Mr. Barnard is also an Adjunct Professor of Law at Case Western Reserve University School of
Law and at Cleveland-Marshall School of Law, Cleveland State University. Mr. Barnard is a Fellow
of the College of Labor and Employment Lawyers. Mr. Barnard holds a B.A. from the University of
Puget Sound, a J.D. from Columbia University School of Law, and an L.L.M. from Case Western
Reserve Law School.
** Adrienne L. Rapp is an Associate in the Employment and Labor Group at Ulmer & Berne LLP in
Cleveland, Ohio. She graduated from The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law in 2004.
Ms. Rapp served as the Executive Editor of the Ohio State Law Journal from 2003-04. She was a
Staff Member on the Ohio State Law Journalfrom 2002-03.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000). Section 703 of Title VII, as amended, provides
in relevant part, that: "(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) .. . to
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sage of this Act represented a significant shift in political consensusone that finally acknowledged a need to back the civil rights cause with
federal legislative power. 2
The "moral crisis" of race discrimination prompted President Kennedy to introduce a civil rights bill in Congress.3 Contemporaneous with
his signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law, President Lyndon B.
Johnson outlined the social injustices underpinning the passage of that
Act:
We believe that all men are created equal. Yet many are denied equal
treatment. We believe that all men have certain unalienable rights. Yet
many Americans do not enjoy those rights. We believe that that all
men are entitled to the blessings of liberty. Yet millions are being deprived of those blessings-not because of their own failures, but because of the color of their skin....
But it cannot continue. Our Constitution, the foundation of our Republic, forbids
it. Morality forbids it. And the law I will sign tonight for4
bids it.

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin ..
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
2. See Michael W. Combs & Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisiting Brown v. Board of
Education: A Cultural,Historical-Legaland PoliticalPerspective,47 How. L.J. 627, 649 (2004).
From 1960 [to] 1964, both the Democrat and Republican parties were committed to a
civil rights agenda that would ultimately reconfigure the power ratio between African
Americans and Whites at several levels, including the electoral process, the distribution
of jobs and opportunities, the impact of racist values and institutions on the lives of
African Americans ....
Id. at 651. The culmination of this effort was the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id. at
649. Currently, the federal laws that prohibit job discrimination include: (1) Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964; (2) the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA); (3) the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA); (4) Title I and Title V of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA); (4) Sections 501 and 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and (5) the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. See EEOC, FEDERAL LAWS PROHIBITING JOB DISCRIMINATION QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS, available at http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last modified May 24, 2002)
[hereinafter EEOC Q&A].
3. THE LIBRARY OF AMERICA, REPORTING ON CIVIL RIGHTS
1941-1973, at
http://www.reportingcivilrights.org/timeline/year.jsp?year=-1963 (last accessed Jan. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter LIBRARY OF AMERICA]. Kennedy labeled racial discrimination "a moral crisis" during a
televised address given on June 11, 1963. Id.
4. Michael Jay Friedman, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, NATION CELEBRATES ANNIVERSARY OF
LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 40 YEARS OLD, (June 24, 2004), at
http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/civilrights/a062404.htm. President Johnson signed the 1964 Civil Rights
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As President Johnson's statement evinces, the enactment of
Title VII establishes the need to prohibit discrimination upon two beliefs-that it is unfair and it is immoral to discriminate on the basis of5
the immutable characteristics of race, sex, religion and national origin.
Consequently, when assessing the impact of Title VII, one cannot divorce the legal mandates from the moral ideals underlying the law.
Packed into the Act are promises that continue to drastically transform the American workforce. Title VII has broad reach, extending to
the following terms and conditions of employment: "hiring and firing;
compensation, assignment, or classification of employees; transfer, promotion, layoff, or recall; job advertisements; recruitment; testing; use of
company facilities; training and apprenticeship programs; fringe benefits; [or] pay, retirement plans, and disability leave." 6 In addition, Title
VII prohibits certain forms of harassment, retaliation against an individual who is involved with the filing or investigation of a charge of discrimination and decision-making on the basis of proscribed stereotypes.7
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and federal courts began to tackle legal challenges to workplace discrimination
immediately after the enactment of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Their interpretations of Title VII's broad proscriptions inevitably fueled widespread social change. In essence, forty years of employment discrimination case law and EEOC guidelines blueprint a dramatic cultural
revolution.
Act into law on July, 2, 1964. Id. The Act signified a culmination of the growing political will to
enact and enforce bold remedies for employment discrimination:
Even though some Americans continued to fight for more expansive civil rights protections, only a broad political consensus could overcome the racial segregation that prevailed in much of the South. It took several generations, and a number of new developments, to produce that consensus. After the second World War, Black migration to the
northern states gradually increased political pressure on officeholders there, Northern
Democrats in particular, to back civil rights legislation against the objections of prosegregation Southern Democrats.... The Supreme Court began to rethink its earlier,
pinched interpretation of Constitutional civil rights guarantees, most notably in Brown v.
Boardof Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ....
Id. Moreover, the "contrast between the non-violent civil rights movement and its opponents' often
savage response convinced growing numbers of Americans that justice required effective legal
guarantees." Id.
5. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
31 (Aspen Publishers, 6th ed., 2003).
6.
EEOC Q&A, supra note 2.
7. See id. Note that when a violation of Title VII is found, relief to a successful plaintiff
may include back pay, hiring, promotion, reinstatement, front pay, reasonable accommodation or
any other actions that would return the individual to the condition in which he or she would have
been but for the discrimination. Id. A plaintiff may also recover attorneys' fees, expert witness fees,
court costs, compensatory and punitive damages. Id.
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This Article will provide an overview of the evolutionary developments in employment law, placed in the context of Title VII jurisprudence, with an eye toward whether we have achieved the lofty goals embodied in that legislation. Statistics covering discrimination incidents
and charges filed with the EEOC will be examined to trace the impact
that anti-discrimination efforts have had on employment opportunities in
this country. Through anecdotal evidence of the employment discrimination faced by Americans in each decade, Section II will assess the legal
and social changes promised by the Act. The changes resulting from the
enforcement of Title VII prohibitions will be examined by tracing incremental jumps in the number of charges filed to social events that increased the popular awareness of proscribed discrimination. Finally,
Section III will look at the developing face of America's workforce to
predict future issues likely to challenge the efforts to eradicate employment discrimination.

EEOC STATISTICS THROUGH THE LENS OF
SOCIAL CHANGE AND LANDMARK COURT DECISIONS:
A DECADE BY DECADE APPROACH

ANALYSIS OF

The number of discrimination charges filed with the EEOC has
steadily increased over the years. 8 In 1966, 8,854 charges of discrimination were filed. 9 By 2003, that number had increased to 81,293.10
Initially, the majority of the charges filed with the EEOC consisted
of claims of race discrimination. Race-based complaints comprised
nearly 60% of the cases.11 Charges of sex discrimination were the second most frequently filed, equaling about 37% of total charges.1 2 In
2003, by contrast, only 35% of charges filed with the EEOC alleged discrimination on the basis of race.13 That year, the total charges filed consisted of approximately
35%
race-based charges,
30% sex,

8.

EEOC,

CHARGE

STATISTICS:

FY

1992

THROUGH

FY

2003,

available at

http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Mar. 8, 2004) [hereinafter CHARGE
STATISTICS 1992-2003]. Although the overall number of charges filed continues to increase, EEOC

reports evidence slight decreases in 1995, 1996 and 2003. Id.
9. See EEOC FIRST ANN. REP., 90TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, H.R. Doc. NO. 86, at 58
(1967) [hereinafter FIRST ANN. REP.] (reporting EEOC charges filed from July 2, 1965 to June 30,

1966).
10.
11.
12.
13.

CHARGE STATISTICS 1992-2003, supra note 8.
See FIRST ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 58.
Id.
CHARGE STATISTICS 1992-2003, supra note 8.
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28% retaliation, 10% national origin, and 3% religion. 14 Although the
number of race and sex discrimination claims have steadily increased
over the past thirty years and still remain the most frequently filed
charges of discrimination, religion, national origin and especially retaliation claims are being filed with increasing frequency.15
The following sections take a decade by decade look at the past
forty years, with a view toward identifying the specific jurisprudential
and cultural events that have most impacted the number of discrimination charges filed, and their general impact upon employment in the
United States.
1960s: Getting Off the Ground
The employment practices of the beginning to mid-1900s were far
different from that of today. For example, classified advertisements once
overtly excluded minorities and women from employment opportunities.1 6 Alternatively, "[r]ace, religion and age were all considered legitimate requirements for poorly paid positions."1" One employment ad in
an early 20th century New York newspaper sought a "[n]eat colored
girl;" another requested a "[g]irl, light colored" applicant.1 8 And a reference manual, entitled Getting and Keeping Classified Advertising, provided the following instruction to employers: "Most newspapers in
America prohibit mention of the phrase 'no Filipinos' or 'Mohammedans' in their advertising .... On the other hand, an inclusive restriction
such as 'Mohammedans only,' by expressing a preference, implies a
compliment and is therefore never rejected."' 19 As the above examples
suggest, throughout the country, discriminatory employment practicesincluding those based specifically on race or gender classificationswere the rule, not the exception. In the 1960s, however, this would all
begin to change.
14.
15.

Id. The percentages are rounded and therefore do not equal 100%.
Id. For a discussion regarding the increasing frequency with which charges of retaliation

and discrimination on the basis of national origin and religion are filed, see Section III of this
Article.
16. See Cynthia Crossen, ClassifiedAds Tell Tales of Social Change: Sober Need Not Apply,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2003, at BI (citing, for example, the common request for "White Only" job

applicants).
17.

Id.

18.

Id.

19.

Id.

(quoting

MORTON

J.A.

MCDONALD,

GETrING

AND

KEEPING

CLASSIFIED

ADVERTISING (1935)). An EEOC report claimed that the practice of discriminatory advertising by
Southern self-help columns persisted into the 1970s. FIRST ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 6 (reporting

that, in the South, self-help columns continued to designate jobs as "White or colored").
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Congress Creates the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964
It had been estimated that two thousand charges of discrimination
would be filed the first year after the passage of the Civil Rights Act. a°
But on July 2, 1965, the EEOC first opened its doors to an "instant backlog of nearly 1,000 complaints, called 'charges." ' ' 2' From July to December 1965, 8,852 total charges would be filed, far exceeding the
original estimates. 2 2 In fact, by the late 1960s, the EEOC had already received more than 1,500 charges against one company alone.23
At this time, the EEOC was not an agency with independent enforcement powers. 24 Instead, the Commission consisted of "a fivemember bipartisan commission" that had only the "power to receive, investigate, and conciliate complaints where it found reasonable cause to
believe that discrimination had occurred., 25 But the lack of enforcement
power did not diminish the ability of the Agency to influence employment practices. During this period, the EEOC focused its attention on
educating the public through the issuance of interpretive Guidelines and
through its use of26the EEO-1 reports submitted to the Agency by employers each year.
A central responsibility assumed by the EEOC was the issuance of
Guidelines that helped define discrimination in the workplace.27 Because
there was little judicial precedent available to guide employers seeking

EEOC, THE STORY OF THE U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION:
5 (2000) [hereinafter EEOC STORY].
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal Defense Fund was
responsible for most of the charges initially sent to the Commission. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. EEOC and AT&T Agreement: Prelude to a New Era of Enforcement, EEOC STORY,
supra note 20, at 10. American Telephone & Telegraph is the company referred to in the text
(AT&T). See id. (detailing the charges filed against AT&T).
24. EEOC STORY, supra note 20, at 1.
25. Id. at 3. "[Tlhe statute provided only that individuals could bring private lawsuits, and
where [the] EEOC found evidence of 'patterns or practices' of discrimination, [the] EEOC could
then refer such matters to the Department of Justice for litigation." Id.
26. Companies that have more than one hundred employees, or employ fifty or more
employees and have Federal contracts totaling $50,000 or more, are required to complete an annual
EEO-1 report. EEOC, A Charge Has Not Been Filed Against my Company. Do I Need to Keep
Records
or
File
Reports
with
the
EEOC?,
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/recordsandreports.html (last modified June 28, 2002). The report
submitted by the employer must detail that company's composition in terms of gender and
racial/ethnic group. EEOC STORY, supranote 20, at 9.
27. See id. at 6-7 (describing the various Guidelines issued by the EEOC).
20.

ENSURING THE PROMISE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR 35 YEARS, at
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to comply with the new law, and Congress did not specifically define

"discrimination" in the statutory text of Title VII, the Guidelines provided much needed interpretative assistance. 28 For example, the EEOC

tackled issues such as "how to prove discrimination; what remedies were
available under the law; and how to reconcile the seniority rights of cur-

rent 'innocent' employees with the rights of victims who, but for an employer's discrimination, would have greater seniority. 29
The EEOC is also responsible for monitoring the submission of
EEO-1 reports by employers. 30 "The EEO-1 reports and studies, other
labor force data, and charge information [are] an invaluable tool to pinpoint possible zones of employment discrimination, and to identify ma-

jor patterns of exclusion and discriminatory practices in select industries,
job categories, and geographic areas., 31 For example, in 1967, after just
one year of reporting, the EEOC identified multiple employment areas in
which discriminatory practices were particularly egregious.32 The EEOC

then sponsored a series of hearings to draw public attention to their findings. 33 The following are examples of discriminatory employment practices documented and presented during the 1967 hearings:
Although minorities constituted more than 30% of the population in
South Carolina and 22% in North Carolina, African Americans were
only 8.4% of textile industry employees. Moreover, 99% of African
Americans were in the lowest-paid job categories, and only 2.3% of
28. Id. at 5, 7. Court opinions frequently cite EEOC Guidelines to support their holdings. For
example, the 1968 EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination declared that federal law preempted
state-level protective legislation. Id. at 7. The EEOC further declared that the protective legislation,
"which purported to help women by providing special benefits such as extra work breaks, shorter
work hours, and early retirement," in fact "operated to discriminate against and exclude women
from jobs." Id. at 7-8. This interpretation was relied upon by the federal courts when deciding
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 1971) and Weeks v. Southern
Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969).
29. THE EEOC STORY, supranote 20, at 5-6.
30.
Section 709(c) of Title VII granted authority to the EEOC to require private employers to
submit records and reports on the employment status of minorities and women. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-8(c) (2000). The EEOC can compel an employer to submit a report by obtaining an order
from a District Court. EEOC, STANDARD FORM 100, REV. 3-97, EMPLOYER INFORMATION REPORT
EEO-l, 100-118, INSTRUCTION BOOKLET, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeolsurvey/elinstruct.html (last
modified Apr. 20, 2000).
EEOC STORY, supra note 20, at 9.
31.
32. Id. at 9-10.
33.
Id. at 9. "These hearings focused on the textile industry in the South; white collar employment in major New York corporations; aerospace, entertainment, banking, insurance and other
industries in Los Angeles; discriminatory practices preventing minorities and women from participating in Houston's expanding economy; and nationwide practices of the pharmaceutical and utility
industries." Id. at 9-10.
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African Americans were in craftsman or foreman positions.
Of 4,278 New York City companies submitting EEO-1 reports in
1967, about 1,827 did not employ a single African American worker in
a white collar job, and 1,936 did not employ a single Puerto Rican or
other Spanish-surnamed individual in such jobs.
Concentrations of minorities and women were found in Houston's unskilled, lowest-paying jobs in the lowest-paying industries despite generally rising employment opportunities.
Discriminatory employment patterns existed in the nation's 32 largest
pharmaceutical firms.
The utility industry ranked last in employment of African American
workers among the 23 largest U.S. industries and had fewer
34 women
and Spanish-surnamed employees than most other industries.
The reports were and continue to be important tools used to educate
the public about discriminatory employment practices. The reports may
also play a role in litigation; plaintiffs and defendants can use the data
collected in EEO-1 forms to support or defend against charges of employment discrimination.
The next two subsections discuss two most prevalent forms of discrimination reported in the 1960s: discrimination on the basis of "race"
and "sex."
Discrimination on the Basis of Race in the 1960s
In the 1960s, occupational segregation, like the racial discrimination prevalent in all other realms of society, was widespread. 35 The Su34.
35.

Id. at 10.
The housing industry, for example, was notoriously segregated. For many years the in-

dustry issued official policies warning about desegregated neighborhoods. Regarding the presence

of African Americans in white neighborhoods, the Federal Housing Administration underwriting
manual noted that "change in social or racial occupancy generally contributes to instability and a
decline in values." Combs, supra note 2, at 638 (quoting FED. Hous. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING
MANUAL, §§ 934, 937 (1934)). Their presence was expressly deemed to be an "adverse influence."
Id. Also exemplifying the racial division that marked this decade: "Freedom Rides" of 1961; the
confrontation between federal marshals and a mob over the court-ordered admission of James
Meredith to the University of Mississippi in 1962; the 1963 Birmingham protest (where rioters were
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preme Court had only recently decided Brown v. Board of Education,
thus ending a tradition of unequal treatment for African Americans sanctioned by law. 37 But this achievement was still marred by a persistent
"code of separation" that operated to effectively keep African Americans
"out of the mainstream of American life.",38

Anecdotal evidence collected from this decade demonstrates the extent of the country's racial division. For example, in a Civil Rights
Documentation Project Interview, James Miller describes having to
search for employment only open to minorities.3 9 When asked whether
the "white" and "black" job distinction was an unofficial policy or way
out in the open, Mr. Miller responded:

attacked with dogs and fire hoses); riots in Los Angeles in 1965; riots in Newark and Detroit in
1967; and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in 1968. See LIBRARY OF AMERICA, supra
note 3.
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
37. Id. at 495. The infamous Dred Scott decision adds historical context to the racial struggles of this country. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the inferior status afforded
blacks:
They had ...been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they
had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly
and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.... This opinion was at that time fixed
and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in
morals as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be open
to dispute ....
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856). The following recounts the watershed social implications of the Supreme Court's holding in Brown:
Brown ranks among the first instances in which a modem American institution actually
tackled the cultural basis of racism and discrimination. More directly, during oral arguments to consider the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, the Justices
seemed to have understood the political and cultural importance of possibly overturning
the doctrine that shaped race relations for more than fifty years. The Warren Court's
strategy to treat severally the constitutional pronouncement and the remedial decree suggests its awareness of how the separate but equal doctrine legitimated and gave rise to
the institution of racial practices and a way of life that was clearly manifested throughout
the American society. These racial practices and patterns were particularly manifested in
the South. The separate but equal doctrine did not create the racial culture addressed in
Brown and subsequent decisions, but rather represented the constitutionalization of postCivil War cultural traditions and policy.
Combs, supra note 2, at 627-28 (citations omitted). For more information on the ways in which
Brown "served as a catalyst for cultural transformation in America," see id. at 644-49.
38. Combs, supra note 2, at 635 (citations omitted).
39. Interview by Stephanie Scull Millet with James P. Miller Sr., Civil Right Documentation
Project Interview (2000), at http://www.usm.edu/crdp/html/transcripts/manuscript-miller-jamesp-sr.html.
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Oh, that was in the open. Like in the contract book, they had about six
locals represented at the paper mill at that time. And five of them were
white, and one served all the black people at the paper mill. That was
before the days of black women at the paper mill, too .... So the perI said, "Man,
sonnel director.., said, "Hey, that boy over there ....
that sounds like me.".. . Made my way up through the crowd, and like
I say, then your credentials didn't mean nothing because you had a certain job you were going to do anyhow.40
Mr. Miller's interview tells of African American factory workers
who were often assigned the most difficult and dangerous jobs. 4' He was
fired from that job after fifteen years for "insubordination. ' 42 According
to Mr. Miller, he was terminated for suggesting that a manufacturing
procedure could be improved.43
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in the 1960s
A 1957 Presidential Commission found that "both men and women
generally take it for granted that the male is the family bread winner and
that he has a superior claim to available work, particularly over the
woman who does not have to support herself."44 This attitude evidences
a cultural attitude unprepared to grant women easy access to the workforce. In the early 1960s, for example, women were afforded no protection against disadvantageous seniority systems, promotion and training
policies.4 5
More than one-third of the charges filed with the Equal Employment Commission in its first year included allegations of sex discrimination.46 The charges filed generally contained allegations regarding three
issues: benefits; workplace opportunities; and post-marriage or postbirth terminations. 47 Charges of discrimination involving benefits alleged that "men receiv[ed] better life insurance, health and pension
benefits., 48 In addition, "[o]ne-quarter of the complaints addressed work
opportunities with women complaining that they were shut out of jobs
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
id.
See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY 211 (2001).
See Vicki Lens, Supreme Court Narratives on Equality and Gender Discrimination in

Employment: 1971-2002, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 501, 507 (2004).
46.
47.

See id. at 507 n.36 (citing FIRST ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 58-59).
Id. at 507.

48.

Id.
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because of seniority rules or because men were preferred over women
after layoffs. 4 9
The decade was not without progress. Congress passed the Equal
Pay Act in 1963,50 which required equal pay for equal work. 51 But some

believed that the redress available through that Act proved an inadequate
response to the inequities faced by women in the workplace:
[T]he Act, the first major piece of federal legislation that directly addressed sexual discrimination in the workplace, had serious deficiencies. Since women did few[er] jobs that men did, the equal pay for
equal work formula was often not applicable. Earlier versions had proposed equal pay for comparable work, a distinction that would have
permitted comparisons between women's gender segregated jobs and
men's more lucrative jobs. The word "equal" was substituted for

"comparable" as a compromise to obtain passage of the Act since its

purpose was also to protect men, even sometimes at women's expense.
Requiring employers to pay men and women the same for equal work
discouraged employers from hiring women because they could pay
them less, a practice begun during World War 11.52
Title VII would provide a solution to many of the Equal Pay Act
loopholes. With its passage, the EEOC began to redefine the practices
listed above as discrimination, instead of viewing them as natural and
appropriate roles of women in society.5 3 Many of these problematic inequities in sex-based discrimination would be exposed and addressed
during the 1970s, when public opinion began
to shift, and "women's lib54
eration had become a household word.,
1970s: FundamentalChanges and Major Issues Confronted:
Hiring,Discharge,And Segregation
The greatest increase in charges based on race and sex discrimination occurred between 1970 and 1972. Several factors were likely to
have contributed to this increase. First, Congress, confronted with statis49.

Id. (citation omitted).

50.
51.

See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2000); see also Lens, supra note 45, at 506.
29 U.S.C. § 206.

52. Lens, supra note 45, at 506 (internal citations omitted).
53. Id. at 508.
54. Id. at 509 (internal citations omitted). Lens cites a study that found that nearly 40% of
women were in favor of "most efforts to strengthen and change women's status in society" in the
early 1970s. Id. (citing MYRAK MARX FERREE & BETH HESS, CONTROVERSY AND COALITION: THE
NEW FEMINIST MOVEMENT ACROSS FOUR DECADES OF CHANGE 88 (2000)).
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tics revealing pervasive employment discrimination,55 expanded the authority of the EEOC in 1972.56 Most importantly, Congress granted the
EEOC direct enforcement powers, enabling the Commission to become
more active in its equal employment litigation efforts. 57 In addition, during the early part of this decade, a number of important federal and Supreme Court decisions set the framework for plaintiffs to successfully
combat workplace discrimination.
Perhaps the most significant development in case law during this
decade was the development of a shifting burden of proof framework
that enabled a plaintiff to establish discriminatory intent through use of
circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court set forth this structure in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.58 That case involved a charge of
disparate treatment discrimination, a situation where one employee
alleges that he or she is treated differently than another similarly situated59
employee based on his or her race (or other protected characteristic).
Under the McDonnell Douglas proof structure:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under
the statute of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer
was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and
the employer continued 6to seek applicants from persons of the com0
plainant's qualifications.
After a plaintiff has successfully established such a prima facie case
of discrimination, "[tlhe burden then must shift to the employer to
articulate some legitimate, non[-]discriminatory reason for the
employee's rejection., 61 After the employer sets forth this reason, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must then establish that the
55. Congress concluded during a public hearing held in 1971 that "employment discrimination is even more pervasive and tenacious than... Congress had assumed ...[when] it passed the
1964 Act." EEOC, THE STORY, supra note 20, at 15.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (2000). In the Equal Employment Act of 1972, "[the] EEOC
received litigation authority to sue nongovernmental 'respondents'-employers, unions, and
employment agencies; EEOC could file pattern and practice lawsuits; Title VII coverage was
expanded to include the federal government and state and local governments, educational

institutions; [and] the number of employees... [were] reduced from 25 to 15 .... EEOC STORY,
supra note 20, at 15.

57.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (2000).

58.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).

59.
60.

Id. at 801-02.
Id. at 802.

61.

Id.
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back to the plaintiff, who must then establish that the employer's articulated non-discriminatory reason is in fact mere pretext for discriminatory
although the ultimate burden always remains with the
intent. 62 Thus, at
plaintiff to prove a violation of Title VII, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework affords plaintiffs a fair opportunity to demonstrate an adverse employment decision and that the reasons given for
that decision were in reality a cover-up for a proscribed discriminatory
decision.63 The McDonnell Douglas case therefore created a method of
proof which allows victims of a more subtle form of discrimination a
better chance of establishing their claim.
Discrimination on the Basis of Race in the 1970s
In the 1970s, a number of important federal and Supreme Court decisions began to define the parameters of discrimination proscribed by
Title VII. For example, in Slack v. Havens,64 three African American
employees alleged that they were discriminatorily discharged when refusing to do heavy clean-up work that was not in their job descriptions. 65
This same task was not required by a white employee employed in the
same position.66 The significance of this case lay in its attribution of the
blatant discriminatory comments made by the supervisor. 67 Such comments included: "[c]olored people are hired to clean because they clean
better" and that "[c]olored people should stay in their places., 68 The
Slack court made clear that such comments could bear a causal relation
to the plaintiffs' subsequent termination, evidencing an intent to discriminate for which the employer would be liable.69
Cases such as Slack emphasized the dangers of stereotyping in the
workplace and the discrimination that may derive from employer
perceptions about various minority groups. One study, conducted in
1975, warned of decision-making by employers that was unconsciously
influenced by stereotypes.70 Although today theories about unconscious
stereotyping may seem relatively well-known and accepted, it was only
62.

Id. at 804.

63.
64,

See id. at 807.
522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975).

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 1092-93.
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1092-93.
Id.
Id. at 1095.
Stephen L. Cohen & Kerry A. Bunker, Subtle Effects of Sex Role Stereotypes on Recruit-

ers' Hiring Decisions, 60 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 566, 572 (1975).
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in the 1970s that these theories gained legal momentum and recognition
from the federal courts.
From disparate treatment, the courts turned their attention to disparate impact. At the beginning of the 1970s, the Supreme Court first applied Title VII to eliminate seemingly arbitrary job employment tests
and qualifications, when those requirements were unrelated to the job at
issue. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 71 Chief Justice Burger demanded
"the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the
basis of racial or other impermissible classification., 72 Under Title VII,
the court held "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to
73
'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."
In turn, Chief Justice Burger held that "[t]he touchstone is business necessity... [.] [G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as
'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability. 7 4 Thus, the Court focused on whether the effect of the
requirement was discriminatory,
regardless of whether the employer had
75
discriminate.
to
purpose
the
Nevertheless, disparate treatment and even disparate impact did not
address the lingering effects of 250 years of institutionalized racism.
Consequently, affirmative action came into existence. The United States
Commission on Civil Rights defined affirmative action as "any measure,
beyond simple termination of a discriminatory practice, adopted to correct or compensate for past or present discrimination or to prevent dis-

71. 401 U.S. 424(1971).
72. Id. at 431. The Griggs Court stated:
We granted the writ in this case to resolve the question whether an employer is prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, from requiring a high school education or
passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a condition of employment in or
transfer to jobs when (a) neither standard is shown to be significantly related to successful job performance, (b) both requirements operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white applicants, and (c) the jobs in question formerly had been
filled only by white employees as part of a longstanding practice of giving preference to
whites.
Id. at 425-26.
73. Id. at 430.
74. Id. at431-32.
75. "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation." Id. at 432. But cf United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560
(1977) (holding that an employer cannot be held liable for a time-barred discriminatory act even if
the effects of that act are still being felt by the employee).
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crimination from recurring in the future."7 6 Affirmative action policies
are implemented in a variety of settings, including the grant of government contracts, university admission policies, and public and private
sector decision-making processes regarding the hiring or promotion of
certain individuals.7 7
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court addressed affirmative action programs in two major opinions. In Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke, 78 the Court found that race may be used as a determinative factor when choosing among qualified applicants for university admission. 79 The Bakke Court also ruled that a school may not reserve a set
number of seats out of each entering class for minority students. 80 The
Supreme Court next addressed affirmative action programs in United
Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. Weber, 81 ruling that that raceconscious affirmative action efforts designed to eliminate a conspicuous
racial imbalance in an employer's workforce resulting from past discrimination are permissible if they are temporary and do not violate the
rights of white employees.82 The Court further ruled that affirmative action "does not unnecessarily trammel the interest of white employees ....[Since] half of those trained in the program will be white [and]
the plan is [only] a temporary measure[,] it is not intended to maintain83
racial balance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance.,
Thirty years later, these landmark court holdings would be revisited, in
Gratz v. Bollinger84 and Grutter v. Bolinger,85 as an implicit recognition
by the Court of the continual need to evaluate and reassess methods employed to remedy past discriminatory practices.
Discrimination on the Basis of Sex in the 1970s
Help wanted advertisements soliciting "women only" applicants
76.

NEWS

BATCH,

http://www.newsbatch.com/race.htm

RACE

AND

ETHNIC

POLICY

ISSUES,

at

(last modified Sept. 2004) [hereinafter NEWS BATCH].

77. Id.
78. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
79. See id. at 314.
80. See id. at 307.
81. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
82. Id. at 208-09.
83. Id. at 208.
84. 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (ruling that the use of race by an undergraduate institution's freshman admission policy violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI and Section 1981).
85. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that a law school may consider race and ethnicity as a factor in its admission program).
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persisted into the 1970s, despite the proscriptions of the Civil Rights
Act. 86 Female-dominated jobs consisted primarily of low-wage positions: waitresses, secretaries, cashiers, or domestic workers.87 One study,
evidencing this trend, found that women comprised 98.5% of secretaries
and typists in 1976.88 Accordingly, dramatic disparities still remained
between the employment status and opportunities available to men and
women. "As surveys during the decade demonstrated, men still overwhelmingly (950/o-97%) comprised senior management and executive

positions in the nation's largest corporations and although the disparity
between women's and men's wages decreased during the decade, by its
were still earning only seventy-four cents to a man's dolend women
9
lar."

8

But the 1970s also brought forth a variety of new legislation 90 and
interpretative case law designed to elevate the status of women. Prior to
1970, the Supreme Court often upheld protective legislation limiting
women's ability to work. 91 During the 1970s, by contrast, court opinions
began to reject former stereotypes regarding women's status in society.92
In Frontiero v. Richardson,93 for example, Justice Brennan emphasized
this shift:
There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate
history of sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was
rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism,' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage. Indeed, this paternalistic attitude became so firmly rooted in our national consciousness that, 100 years ago, a distinguished Member of this Court was

also able to proclaim: [m]an is, or should be; woman's protector and
defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
86.

Judith L. Lichtman, The Glass Ceiling: Lifted or Shattered?, EEOC STORY, supra note

20, at 16.
87. Id.
88. Lens, supra note 45, at 509 n.57 (citing Nancy Maclean, The Hidden History of Affirmative Action: Working Women's Struggles in the 1970s and the Gender of Class, 25 FEMtNIST STUD.
43, 55 (1999)).
89. Id. at 512 (internal citations omitted).
90. See Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in credit transactions); Civil Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000) (prohibiting sex discrimi-

nation in educational programs that are federally funded); Equal Pay Act of 1972, 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (2000); Women's Educational Equity Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 3041 (2000) (repealed in
1982).

91. For a more detailed look at the development of women's status in the workplace, see
generally Lens, supra note 45, at 503-17.
92.
93.

See id.at 526.
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of
civil life ....
As a result of notions such as these, our statute books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes and,
indeed throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in
our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under
the pre-Civil War slave codes ....

And although blacks were guaran-

right.94
teed the right to vote in 1870, women were denied even that

The 1970s ultimately proved to be a watershed period for challenging traditional notions of gender as women fought for an end to occupational segregation. Along with the attainment of equal workplace opportunities, women sought to end workplace harassment as well.
Sexual Harassment Generally Unrecognized as an
Actionable Form of Discrimination in the 1970s
Today it is generally recognized that a supervisor's sexual advances
or demands of an employee impose a sex-based "term or condition" of
employment that is prohibited by Title VII. But for many years after the
enactment of Title VII, courts did not universally recognize that sexual
advances fall within the definitional ambit of Title VII. 95 The initial battles regarding the scope of Title VII coverage struggled to distinguish
the interpersonal disputes of employees (in which courts should not be
involved) from the use of supervisory or managerial power to force subordinate submission to sexual advances (which would then qualify as a
policy or practice prohibited by Title VII).
Prior to 1976, conduct that today would constitute "sexual harassment" was treated by the courts as a purely personalmatter, rather than
an issue of workplace equality.96 Accordingly, defendants successfully
94. Id. at 684-85 (internal citations omitted).
95. See, e.g., Come v. Baush & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) ("[T]here
is nothing in the Act which could reasonably be construed to have it apply to 'verbal and sexual
advances' by another employee, even though he be in a supervisory capacity where such complained of acts or conduct had no relationship to the nature of the employment."); Tomkins v. Pub.
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) ("[S]exual harassment and sexually
motivated assault do not constitute sex discrimination under Title VIL.")
96. See, e.g., Smith v. Rust Eng'g Co., No. 78-M-0479, 1978 WL 126 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 25,
1978) (McFadden, Arb.). The Rust Engineering court found that claims of sexual advances and remarks must be related to a term or condition of employment to state a claim under Title VII. Id. at
* 1. That court held that where the male employee did the same type of work as the plaintiff, and did
not promise plaintiff anything with respect to her employment, the plaintiff could not show that the
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argued that plaintiffs could not make a case of sex discrimination under
Title VII because the harassment alleged was not a policy or regulation
of the office and instead constituted a purely personal matter that should
not be the concern of the courts.9 7 For example, in Tomkins v. Public
Service Electric & Gas Co.,98 the plaintiff claimed that her employer
conditioned her employment upon her submission to the sexual demands
of a male supervisor. 99 The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs sex
discrimination claim, holding that the acts of the plaintiffs supervisor
constituted a mere "abuse of authority for personal purposes" and was
therefore not actionable under Title VII. 100 Another court found that:
Title VII is directed at acts of employment discrimination and not at
individual acts of discrimination. Therefore, individual acts of sexual
harassment by employees of a defendant employer are not actionable,
unless they are in some manner whether actively or tacitly, sanctioned
10 1
by the employer or constitute an official policy of the employer.
One of the first cases in which a federal court acknowledged sexual
harassment as a viable theory of relief was Barnes v. Costle, °2 decided
in 1977. In Barnes, the D.C. Court of Appeals rejected an argument that
the sexual advances of a supervisor should be treated by the court as a
harmless personal escapade that did not fall within the regulatory ambit
of Title V1 03 The lower court in that case had granted the defendantemployer's motion for summary judgment, holding that Title VII did
"not offer redress for [the female employee's] complaint that her job at
the Environmental Protection Agency was abolished because she repulsed her male superior's sexual advances." 10 4 The appellate court re-

sexual advances were connected to a condition of employment so as to establish a viable claim of
sex discrimination under the Act. Id. at * 1-2.
97. See id.
98. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
99. Id. at 1045-46.
100. Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556. The dismissal of the plaintiff's claim was reversed upon
appeal. Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048-49 (holding that sexual advances in a certain context could constitute evidence of a job-related condition which amounted to an additional duty or burden imposed
because of the employee's gender, thereby triggering the protections afforded by Title VII).
101. Ludington v. Sambo's Rest., Inc., 474 F. Supp. 480, 483 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (internal citation omitted).
102. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
103. Id. at 984, 995.
104. Id. at 984. The circumstances under which the Barnes case arose are alleged as follows:
Shortly after commencement of the employment, she claims, the director initiated a
quest for sexual favors by "(a) repeatedly soliciting [her] to join him for social activities
after office hours, notwithstanding [her] repeated refusal to do so; (b) by making re-
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versal of this holding signaled the emergence of a new concept of sexbased discrimination, making clear that sexual advances by a supervisor
could give rise to Title VII liability. 10 5 The very public implications of
what was once deemed an entirely private matter would only achieve
greater recognition in the decades to come.
1980s and 1990s: Refining Title VII Jurisprudenceand
Tackling More Subtle Forms of Discrimination
By the start of the 1980s, the Supreme Court had set forth a concepfor two theories of discrimination under Title VII: dispaframework
tual
rate treatment and disparate impact. 10 6 The Court spent much of this
decade refining the two theories. The Court also addressed concepts regarding affirmative action, bona fide occupational qualifications, affirmative defenses, and sexual harassment.
Sex Discrimination and Sexual Harassment in the 1980s
For the first time in the 1980s, the majority of women were participants in the labor force-51.2% of all women worked in 1980.107 Yet,
despite the increased participation, the terms of women's employment
remained unequal. 0 8 Surveys conducted in the early 1980s found that
sexual harassment was commonly found in the workplace. 1°9 For exam-

peated remarks to [her] which were sexual in nature; (c)by repeatedly suggesting to
[her] that if she cooperated with him in a sexual affair, her employment status would be
enhanced." Appellant states that she "continually resisted [his] overtures ... and finally
advised him that notwithstanding his stated belief that many executives 'have affairs
with their personnel,' she preferred that their relationship remain a strictly professional
one." Thereafter, she charges, the director "alone and in concert with other agents of
[appellee], began a conscious campaign to belittle [her], to harass her and to strip her of
her job duties, all culminating in the decision of [appellee's] agent ...to abolish [her]
job in retaliation for [her] refusal to grant him sexual favors." These activities, appellant
declares, "would not have occurred but for [her] sex."
Id. at 985 (internal citations omitted). The Barnes trial court granted the defendant-employer's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff had failed to plead facts entitling her to relief under Title VII. Id. at 984.
105. See id. at 994.
106. Disparate impact involves seemingly neutral job standards or qualifications and the unintended but prohibited discrimination that results from those standards or qualifications. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000).
107. Lens, supra note 45, at 509. By contrast, only 43.3% of women were employed in 1970.
Id.
108. See id.
109. Id. at 513.
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ple, the first federal survey conducted by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board found that 40% percent of female federal employees that
were surveyed had been victims of sexual harassment. 0
The EEOC did not issue guidelines defining sexual harassment as a
form of sex discrimination until 1980.1" It was during this decade that
the concept of sexual harassment quickly expanded. "Sexual harassment
was broadened to include, in addition to requesting sexual favors in exchange for jobs, promotions, and other job related benefits, the creation
of a hostile work environment,
which made it difficult for women to per2
form their jobs."'
But many courts still remained hesitant to find sexual harassment in
the workplace. For example, in a 1981 district court decision, the court
found that a female employee's claims of sexual harassment were insufficient to establish a prima face case of sex discrimination, despite her
allegations that her immediate supervisor patted her on the bottom,
touched her breast area and attempted to begin an affair with her while
both attended a job-related convention. 1 3 The defendant, Voight, "acknowledge[ed] the bottom patting incidents, stating they occurred rarely
(three to five such incidents from 1973 to 1978), always in the presence
of others, and were not sexually oriented, but intended as a show of support and encouragement when plaintiff expressed a lack of confidence in
herself and her ability."' 1 4 The court cited the following as evidence that
110.
Id.
111. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (2004). The EEOC regulations provide, in pertinent part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of title VII [sic]. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment,
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
(b)In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances, such as
the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the
facts, on a case by case basis.
Id.
112. Lens, supra note 45, at 513.
113. See Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1314-15 (D.N.D. 1981); see also Huebschen v. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983). The Huebschen court found
that there was no legal basis for a claim under Title VII in a sexual discrimination action brought by
a male employee alleging sexual harassment by a female supervisor because his supervisor was not
an "employer" and therefore could not violate Title VII. 716 F.2d at 1170-71.
114.
Walter, 518 F. Supp. at 1314.
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the plaintiffs employment did not suffer as a result of the actions taken
by her male co-worker:
During the time period when the above noted sexual overtures were
made, plaintiff continued in her job, continued to retain and carry out
job related duties and responsibilities, and apparently continued receiving raises. Further, plaintiff received public praise from Voight; was
featured in a 1975 brochure which included several pictures of plaintiff
and described her as 'extremely popular with her large following,
which includes both rural and urban listeners, on and off the air;' and
115
was promoted as a station personality in a 1976 billboard campaign.
According to the court, therefore, plaintiff presented "no evidence
to demonstrate that Voight's conduct had the effect of substantially interfering with plaintiff's work performance or created an intimidating,
hostile or offensive working environment." ' 16 Instead, the court found
that the plaintiffs allegations of unwanted sexual advances amounted to
nothing but a ploy to secure a new position at work. 1 7 Later court holdings would interpret the "terms and conditions of employment" more
liberally, rejecting undue focus upon the presence or absence of economic harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the alleged sexual
8

conduct."

The Supreme Court did not recognize sexual harassment until the
middle of the decade." 9 Instead, during the 1980s, the Supreme Court
largely concerned itself with "equalizing job opportunities by challengId. at 1315-16.
115.
116. Id. at 1316.
117.
Id.
118. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986) ("[T]he District Court
apparently believed that a claim for sexual harassment will not lie absent an economic effect on the

complainant's employment ....

[S]ince it appears that the District Court made its findings without

ever considering the 'hostile environment' theory of sexual harassment, the Court of Appeals' deci-

sion to remand was correct."). In another pioneer Supreme Court case decided during this decade,
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), the Court held that an employer violates Title

VII if gender is a motivating factor in an employment decision. See id. at 242. In that case, the Court
found "clear signs... that some of the partners reacted negatively to Hopkins' personality because
she was a woman. One partner described her as 'macho'; another suggested that she 'overcompensated for being a woman'; a third advised her to take 'a course at charm school."' Id. at 235. In addi-

tion, objections were made to her swearing "because it[']s a lady using foul language." Id. But the
"coup de grace," according to the Supreme Court, was the supervisor who told Hopkins that to im-

prove her chances for partnership, she should "'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."' Id. These sex-based terms
of evaluation were held to violate Title VII by the Supreme Court. See id. at 235, 258.
119.
See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 ("Without question, when a supervisor sexually harasses a

subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex.").
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ing discriminatory seniority rules and women's exclusion from male
dominated occupations. These issues increasingly dominated the court's
docket in the late 1980s.,,120 Challenges to salary differences between
men and women also took the forefront.121 Accordingly, "[n]ew approaches to increasing women's wages were implemented during the
1980s[;] [w]hereas in the 1970s women entered previously male occupations as a way to eliminate the wage gender gap, in the 1980s women
used the principle of pay equality' 22to increase the pay and status of the
traditionally female occupations."'
Today, the practice by employers of formally adopting antiharassment and discrimination policies perhaps best evidences the impact Title VII jurisprudence has had on the American workforce. Yet, in
the 1980s, such policies were not common - "[d]espite the legal and
social recognition of sexual harassment, many businesses were hesitant
123
to implement sexual harassment policies or grievance procedures."
to
Business would not begin to institute formal policies and responses
124
issues of sexual harassment in the workplace until the 1990s.

Discrimination on the Basis of Race in the 1990s
Relations between African Americans and whites have improved in
past decades. The fact that the "races associate with far more frequency
in the workplace" likely contributed to any improvements. 125 Other factors cited to explain improved relations include the increasingly greater
percentage of persons who know, interact and are friendly with those of
other races, increasing numbers of mixed marriages, and the role of mass
media.126 Each "has contributed mightily to improve cross-racial percep-

120.

Lens, supra note 45, at 524. During the 1980s, the Supreme Court "decided eight cases in

this category (in contrast to four the decades before), encompassing such diverse issues as women's
exclusion from the draft, the impact of sexism in previously male-dominated professions such as

accounting, the effect of seniority systems on womens' opportunities and the legitimacy of affirmative action programs." Id. (internal citations omitted).
121.
122.

Seeid.at51-12,524.
Id. at 512. This concept of pay equality "meant that jobs involving similar skill levels,

effort, working conditions, and level of responsibility would be compensated at the same rate of
pay. This highlighted the inequality of paying teachers, nurses and secretaries less than, for example, the typical male jobs of tree trimmers or sign painters." Id. (internal citations omitted).
123. Id. at 513-14.
124. See id. at 515. During the 1990s: "In response to several Supreme Court decisions, businesses ... began adopting sexual harassment policies in greater numbers." Id.
125. NEws BATCH, supra note 76.
126.
Id. Some cite the media portrayal of African American athletes as being particularly influential. See id. ("With far more frequency, African Americans who have become successful ath-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss2/10

22

Barnard and Rapp: Are We There Yet? Forty Years After the Passage of the Civil Righ

2005]

ARE WE THERE YET?

tions between blacks and whites." 127 Even the "'racially conscious etiquette,' which forbids racially derisive speech[,] [that] has emerged particularly among college educated Americans in most areas of the coun28
try" reflects the change in relations between people of different races. 1
In the 1990s and continuing into the 2000s, the courts not only dealt
with employment measures that discriminated against minorities, but
also those that proposed to benefit historically disadvantaged groups.
Today this country remains sharply divided over the recent cases in
which courts have grappled with measures taken by employers and educational facilities to remedy past discriminatory practices.
Perhaps the most notable of these efforts are two cases addressing
the admissions policies at the University of Michigan, Gratz v. Bollinger 129 and Grutter v. Bollinger.'30 In Gratz, the Supreme Court struck
down the policy of the University of Michigan to automatically add
twenty points to a minority candidate's admission score, holding that the
automatic addition of points violated the Constitution by not being narrowly tailored to the legitimate government interest of achieving diversity. 13 ' The Gratz decision demands that institutions implementing af-

firmative action policies are drawn narrowly enough to provide
consideration of each individual applicant. 3 2 In Grutter,by contrast, the
Supreme Court upheld the University of Michigan College of Law's
admission plan, holding that the Law School "has a compelling interest
in attaining a diverse student body.' 33 The difference between Gratz
and Grutter was the individualized consideration of each applicant by
the Law School.
In Grutter,Justice O'Connor specifically referenced the impact that
letes are not stereotyped racially but are admired for their skill and human qualities. It is not surprising that African Americans cherish this aspect of their progress in American society.").
127. Id.
128. Id. Despite the progress made to improve black-white relationships, the race chasm persists. And the potential for violence also remains - the 1992 Los Angeles riots being a clear example. See William Booth & Jeff Adler, 10 Years After Riots: Challenges Remain for Los Angeles,
THE MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 28, 2002, http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/3149454.htm
(providing an assessment of race relations in Los Angeles ten years after the riots). One California
merchant blamed much of the tension on the unemployment facing minorities in Los Angeles:
"'The rich and poor gap is getting bigger. That is the reason for riots. The job is not done with getting a McDonald's there. It is the unemployment."' Id. Although the riots were spurred by the acquittal of the police officers charged with beating Rodney King, the above statement suggests that
the general unrest among certain groups of racial minorities in California has far deeper roots. Id.
129. 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
130. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270.
131.
132. See id. at 271-75.
133.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
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educational opportunities have on employment. According to Justice
O'Connor, "exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and

viewpoints" best prepares students for competition in an increasingly
global marketplace.'

34

These students will, in turn, benefit their future

135
American employers with that exposure.
Issues involving affirmative action programs, or programs that pro-

vide different benefits to minority candidates, are still controversial today and will face continual review and refinement by the courts. In the

Grutter opinion, Justice O'Connor stressed the temporary nature of affirmative action programs. 136 She concluded her opinion by stating that,
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the use of race
to further an interest in student body diversity in the context of public
higher education. Since that time, the number of minority applicants
with high grades and test scores has indeed increased. We expect that
25 yearsfrom now, the use of racialpreferences will no longer be nec37
essary tofurther the interestapproved today.1

This statement could be construed to suggest the year 2029 (or be-

38
fore) as a termination point for race-conscious admissions programs.1
Although affirmative action plans are often justified as a means to rem-

edy past discrimination, Justice O'Connor's prediction that the problem
of racial inclusion will be solved in just twenty-five years seems remarkably idealistic. As Justice Thomas observed in his dissent, educa-

tional statistics regarding minority applicants to law school are not improving:

134. Id. at 330; see also Combs, supra note 2, at 674.
135. Justice Thomas, by contrast, emphasized what he believed to be a negative stigma of under-achievement that accompanied the use of different standards for minority applicants: "I believe
[African Americans] can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Thomas further claimed that "[w]hen [African Americans] take positions in the highest places of
government, industry and academia, it is an open question today whether their skin color played a
part in their advancement. The question itself is the stigma .
I..."
Id. at 373. Thomas also quoted
from Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896), stating that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,
and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Id. at 378.
136. Grutter,539 U.S. at 343.
137. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
138. The Supreme Court has emphasized the temporary nature of minority inclusion plans
before. In Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) the Court wrote that promising a stopping point "[a]sssure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial
and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal of equality itself." Id. at 510 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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The majority does not and cannot rest its time limitation on any evidence that the gap in credentials between black and white students is
shrinking or will be gone in that timeframe. In recent years there has
been virtually no change, for example, in the proportion of law school
applicants with LSAT scores of 165 and higher who are black. In 1993
blacks constituted 1.1% of law school applicants in that score range,
though they represented 11.1% of all applicants.... In 2000 the comparable numbers were 1.0% and 11.3%. No one can seriously contend,
that the racial gap in academic credentials will
and the Court does not,
139
disappear in 25 years.
The dissenting opinions suggest that the twenty-five year limit to
affirmative action programs serves as a means to salvage the constitutionality of the admission program-strict scrutiny review requires that

remedial measures be temporary. 140 Regardless, the division among even
the members of the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality, the
effectiveness, the merit and the proposed duration of affirmative action
programs suggests that the controversy over the use of affirmative action
plans will not soon subside.

Raising Public Awareness About Discrimination on the
Basis of Sex in the 1990s:
Anita Hill, Tailhook and the "Glass Ceiling"
In the early 1990s, the number of charges filed by women alleging
discrimination increased dramatically. 14a The continuing development of
sexual harassment jurisprudence has likely fueled this increase. For example, the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 141 found
that a "concrete psychological harm [is] an element that Title VII does
not require., 143 Harris increased the chances of a victorious plaintiff by
rejecting a requirement that the plaintiff prove that the alleged harassing
conduct "'seriously affect[ed] [the employeej's psychological well-

139.
140.

Grutter,539 U.S. at 375-76 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 386-87.

141. See generally NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, WOMEN AT WORK:
LOOKING BEHIND THE NUMBERS 40 YEARS AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 at 4, 6 (July

at
available
2004)
http://www.rationalpartnership.org/portals/ps/library/CivilRightsAffAction/WomenAtWorkCRA40t
hAnnReport.pdf (discussing how the EEOC received an increased number of sex discrimination
complaints from 1992 to 2003).
142. 510 U.S. 17(1993).
143.

ld.at22.
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being' or led [the plaintiff] to 'suffe[r] injury '"' 144 by finding that
"Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." 14 5 The Harris opinion instead urged courts to look at
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct, 46thus further
defining the parameters of a valid sexual harassment claim.1
In addition to the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,1 47 there
were several other high-profile events in 1991 that likely contributed to
the increased allegations filed: the Anita Hill controversy; the U.S. Navy
Flyers at the Tailhook Association Convention; and The Glass Ceiling
Act. 148
Anita Hill, Tailhook and Educating the Public about the
Prevalence of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace
The issue of sexual harassment gained widespread public attention
with "[t]he nomination of Clarence Thomas for Supreme Court justice
and the accompanying charges of sexual harassment by his former assistant, Anita Hill, in 1991

.,,149

That year, Anita Hill submitted a confiden-

tial affidavit to the Senate Judiciary Committee, charging that U.S. Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas sexually harassed her from 1981
to 1983.150 The Senate hearings were televised, and the entire country

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 23.
147. 2 U.S.C. §§ 601, 1201-02, 1219-20 (2000). Note that Congress enacted the first legislation acknowledging the competing demands of work and parenting in this decade. The Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993 [FMLA], 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-19, 2651-54 (2000) "was the first law to
address this idea by permitting up to twelve weeks unpaid leave of absence for both women and
men for family needs." Lens, supranote 45, at 516.
148. "[T]he Glass Ceiling Act (part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991) mandate[ed] the establishment of a Glass Ceiling Commission to examine barriers to women and minority advancement
in corporate America and formulate a strategic plan to overcome it." Lens, supra note 45, at 515.
"The Commission found a litany of barriers demonstrating that, despite women's gains over the past
decades, a thick residue of discrimination and bias remained. They included corporate climates that
alienated and isolated women, the failure to recruit, mentor or train women for higher positions,
biased rating, performance and testing systems and harassment by colleagues. The Commission also
noted the 'lack of vigorous, consistent monitoring and law enforcement."' Id. (internal citations
omitted).
149. Id. at 515.
150. Gail Schmoller Philbin, The Unspoken Accusation: Decades into the Women's Movement, Victims of Sexual Harassmentare Still Suffering in Silence, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 24,
2004, at GI ("Thanks to the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings in 1991 and other high-profile
cases, more people than ever know what it is and know [that sexual harassment] is illegal, and many
employers have instituted training programs and policies to address it.").
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watched and learned
while Anita Hill recounted the incidents of harass51
endured.1
she
ment
Nineteen ninety-one was also the year of the Navy's Tailhook Association convention. Reports of rampant sexual abuse by naval officers
dominated the national media. 5 2 One-hundred and seventeen officers
were ultimately accused by the
Defense Department as having sexually
15 3
abused 83 women and 7 men.
In 1992, one year after the Anita Hill and Tailhook incidents were
first covered by the national media, the EEOC reported a 62% increase
in the number of charges filed with the Commission alleging sexual harassment. 54 This dramatic increase leaves little doubt regarding the
unique ability of high profile discrimination cases
to educate the public
55
about impermissible forms of discrimination.
Raising Public Awareness about the "Glass Ceiling"
A Wall Street Journal article in 1986 first popularized the term
"glass ceiling.' 56 The term refers to structural barriers within the workforce that prevent the advancement of women and minorities. 57 Statistics, such as those evidencing meager proportions of women employed
as executives or corporate officers, 58 fueled voices calling for an end to
these barriers.' 5 9 In response, as part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress formed the Glass Ceiling Commission. 60 "[Its] mission was to investigate the opportunities for and artificial barriers to the advancement
of women and minority men into management and decision-making positions in corporate
America, and to make recommendations based on
16 1
findings."'
[those]

151.
152.

Id.
Lens, supra note 45, at 515.

153.
154.

Philbin, supra note 150.
Id.

155. During the Clarence Thomas hearings, 9to5, National Association of Working Women,
reported receiving 2,000 calls from women who "said they had no idea the behavior they had endured on the job was illegal .
ld. They also found that "[iun 1999, when the Dear Abby advice
I..."
column printed a letter from a teenager about sexual harassment in an after-school job, 9to5 received another 1,000 calls .
I...
Id.
156. Karen Blumenthal, Room at the Top, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 24, 1986, at 7D.
157. Id.
158. See Lens, supra note 45, at 515 (reporting that "the proportion of women corporate officers in the 500 largest corporations was only 12% in 1999").
159. See id.

160. See id.
161. Lichtman, The Glass Ceiling: Lifted or Shattered?, EEOC
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One of the first reports compiled by the Glass Ceiling Commission
exposed the extent of occupational segregation that persisted along race
and gender lines. 162 The March 1995 report 163 found that although white
men comprised only 43% of the workforce, they held 95% of senior
management positions. 64 Close to 40% of middle management jobs
were held by white women, but only five percent of those jobs were held
by African American women. 165 African American men held even
less. 166
The Glass Ceiling Commission report also sought to educate employers about the benefits of a diverse workforce. 167 That report concluded that companies that "excel at leveraging diversity (including hiring and promoting minorities and women into senior positions) can
experience better financial performance in the long run than those which
are not effective in managing diversity[;]" and that "it is against the best
interests of business to exclude those Americans who constitute twothirds of the total population, two-thirds of the consumer markets, and
more than half of the workforce."' 68 Just as the Anita Hill-Clarence
Thomas hearings and Tailhook scandal focused national attention upon
the problems of sexual harassment, popularizing the Glass Ceiling theories educated the nation about invisible barriers to advancement, our responsibilities regarding those barriers, and the ultimate need to provide
equal workplace achievement opportunities to all employees.
Discrimination on the Basis of National Origin and Religion
In 2002, the biggest increases in charges filed with the EEOC
consisted of allegations of religious discrimination 169 (increasing 21%)

The Commission first met in 1992, and held five hearings around the United States before presenting its findings before Congress in 1995. See id.
162. Id.
163.
FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE
NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL, (Mar. 1995) [hereinafter GOOD FOR BUSINESS].
164. See id. at 12; see also Lichtman, The Glass Ceiling: Lifted or Shattered?, EEOC STORY,

supra note 20, at 17.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. GOOD FOR BUSINESS, supra note 163, at iv.
168. Id. at 11, 14.
169. Religion includes "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of
the employer's business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000ej) (2000).
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17 °
and discrimination on the basis of national origin (increasing 13%).17
This increase is significant because, prior to 2001, the numbers of
charges filed alleging discrimination on the basis of religion or national
origin remained fairly flat. 172 For example, the number of people who
filed charges alleging religious discrimination only increased by about
one hundred per year from 1972 until 2001.173 In 2002, by contrast, the
number of claims filed increased by nearly 500.174 Charges alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin also increased
sharply in
75
2002, from 8,025 charges filed to 9,046 charges filed.
This increase in charges filed after 2001 can most likely be traced
to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks upon the World Trade Center.176 Immediately following the attacks, "[t]he EEOC reported 'a significant increase' in the number of charges alleging discrimination because of national origin or discrimination because of religion." 177 This
increase resulted despite statements issued by the EEOC, 178 Department

170. "National Origin" is not defined in Title VII. The Supreme Court has stated that the "term
'national origin' on its face refers to the country where a person was born, or, more broadly, the
country from which his or her ancestors came." Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88
(1973). In addition, the EEOC has issued guidelines to aid in defining 'national origin'
discrimination. See EEOC, NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL,

§ 13-11 (Dec. 2, 2002), availableat http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html.
171. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Reports Discrimination Charge Filings
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-6-03.html.
172.

Up, at

See EEOC SEVENTH ANN. REP. (1973); see also EEOC TWENTY-FIFTH ANN. REP.

(1991).
173. CHARGE STATISTICS 1992-2003, supra note 8.
174. See id.
175. Id. In 2003, the number of charges filed alleging discrimination on the basis of national
origin or religion decreased slightly from 9,046 to 8,450 and 2,572 to 2,532, respectively; but, note
that the charges filed by every protected group (race, sex, religion, national origin) decreased that
year. Id.
176. Other factors cited include: "[t]he movement toward a twenty-four-hours-a-day/sevendays-a-week economy, with consequent conflict with religious demands for rest and worship on
Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays" [;] "[o]ur nation's increasing diversity, marked by a broad
spectrum of religious traditions, some of which may clash with workplace parameters that do not
take into account the religious observances of immigrant communities; ...[alnd growing emphasis
on material values at the expense of spiritual ones, with employers indicating that workplace
requirements take priority over religious practices." Richard T. Foltin & James D. Standish,

Reconciling Faith and Livelihood: Religion in the Workplace and Title VII, 31 HUM. RTS., Summer
2004, at 19.

177. DEBRA S. KATZ & ALAN R. KABAT, Current Developments in Employment Law: Harassment in the Workplace, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 559 (2004) (citing EEOC, Questions and
Answers about Employer Responsibilities Concerning the Employment of Muslims, Arabs, South
Asians, and Sikhs (July 16, 2002), available at http:www.eeoc.gov/facts/backlash-employer.html.
178. Three days after the terrorist attack, Cari M. Dominguez, Chair of the EEOC publicly
released the following statement:
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of Justice, FBI, and numerous other federal agencies warning against
targeting post-attack animosity at those of Arab-American or Southern
Asian descent.179 For example, the Director of the FBI issued a statement
on September 17, 2001 providing that:
Since the horrific attacks on September 11, dozens of retaliatory hate
crimes have been directed at members of the Arab-American community, including assaults, arson, threatening communications and two
possibly-and I say "possibly"-ethnically motivated murders. Many of
at Muslim houses of worship
these criminal acts have been directed
80
and at Muslim community centers.]
The workplace has not escaped the effects of the backlash.' 8' "As
of May 7, 2002, the EEOC received 488 charges filed by individuals
who believed that they have experienced September 11 'backlash discrimination,' and harassment was alleged in 194 of these charges."' 82 In
one account, for example, five Pakistani-Americans who worked at a
steel plant sued their employer after reporting the taunting they faced by
their co-workers while praying each day at work. 83 The men reported
We should not allow our anger at the terrorists responsible for this week's heinous attacks to be misdirected against innocent individuals because of their religion, ethnicity,
or country of origin . . . . In the midst of this tragedy, employers should take time to be
alert to instances of harassment or intimidation against Arab-American and Muslim employees. Preventing and prohibiting injustices against our fellow workers is one way to
fight back, if only symbolically, against the evil forces that assaulted our workplaces
Tuesday morning.
Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Chair Urges Workplace Tolerance in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks
(Sept. 14, 2001), at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-14-0l.html [hereinafter Press Release, Sept. 14,
2001].
179. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Statements of Department of
Justice Officials, at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/dojstatements.html (last updated Oct. 23,
2001).
10. Robert Mueller, Remarks at FBI News Conference (Sept. 17, 2001), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/legalinfo/dojstatements.html. Attorney General John Ashcroft also issued
a statement, claiming that "[slince September 11, the Civil Rights Division, working closely with
the United States Attorneys and the FBI, has opened over 60 investigations into acts involving force
or threats of force committed in retaliation for the events of September 11. All of these acts include
killings, assaults, the destruction or attempted destruction of businesses, attacks on mosques and
worshipers and death threats." Attorney General John Ashcroft, Excerpt of Testimony Before the
Senate
Committee
on
the
Judiciary
(Sept.
25,
2001),
at
http://www.usdoj .gov/crt/legalinfo/dojstatements.html.
181. See Press Release, Sept. 14, 2001 supra note 178.
182. KATZ & KABAT, supra note 177 (citing Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Provides Answers
about Workplace Rights of Muslims, Arabs, South Asians and Sikhs (May 15, 2002), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5.15.02.html).
183.

See

Z-FILE

EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION,

EXAMPLES

EXPLAINED,

at

http:/lwww.kevin-ho.com/Employment%20Discrim%2OSite/Pages/exam.htm (last accessed Mar. 8,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol22/iss2/10

30

Barnard and Rapp: Are We There Yet? Forty Years After the Passage of the Civil Righ

20051

ARE WE THERE YET?

being called "camel jockeys" and "ragheads."'184 In addition, they
claimed to receive the worst work assignments.' 85 Ultimately, the men
pursued claims that they were discriminated against on the basis of their
national origin and religion. The case was settled for one million dollars.'86
Discrimination against those of different cultures and ethnic heritage, of course, is not a new phenomenon. Immigrants have historically
struggled to assimilate. "The last great immigration wave produced a bitter backlash, epitomized by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the
return, in the 1920s, of the Ku Klux Klan, which not only targeted African Americans, but Catholics, Jews and immigrants as well. ' 87 As the
American workforce becomes increasingly diversified,' it is likely that
problems involving ethnic, racial and religious differences will continue
to arise, despite the progress being made to eradicate other forms of discrimination proscribed by Title VII.

2005) [hereinafter EXAMPLES EXPLAINED].
184. See id.

185. See id. For more examples, see Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Sues Alamo Car Rental for
Religious Bias (Sept. 30, 2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-30-02-f.html [hereinafter
Press Release, EEOC Sues Alamo]; Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Files Post-9/l 1 National Origin
Discrimination Suit Against Chromalloy Castings Tampa Corporation (Sept. 30, 2002), availableat
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-30-02-e.html [hereinafter Press Release, EEOC Files Post-9/l1 National Origin Discrimination Suit]; Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Files Post-9/11 Religion and National Origin Termination Lawsuit Against Worcester Art Museum (Sept. 30, 2002), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/9-30-02.html [hereinafter Press Release, EEOC Files Post-9/11 Religion
and National Origin Termination Lawsuit].
186.

See EXAMPLES EXPLAINED, supra note 183.

187. William Booth, One Nation, Indivisible: Is It History?, THE WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1998,
at Al, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/meltingpot/meltO222.htm. Booth
comments upon the difference between the historical efforts to assimilate and those of today: "many
historians argue that there was a greater consensus in the past on what it meant to be an American, a
yearning for a common language and culture, and a desire--encouraged, if not coerced by members
of the dominant white Protestant culture to assimilate." Id. "Today, [by contrast,] there is more emphasis on preserving one's ethnic identity, of finding ways to highlight and defend one's cultural
roots." Id.
188. Currently, "[f]oreign-bom workers make up nearly 13 percent of the U.S. workforce."
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT ON AMERICAN WORKFORCE 25

(2001), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rtaw/pdf/chapterl.pdf

[hereinafter REPORT ON

AMERICAN WORKFORCE]. For additional projections regarding the future workforce, see infra Section I.
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Increasing Numbers of Title VII Retaliation Claims

are Filed in the 1990s
In recent years, courts have seen an increasing number of Title VII
actions alleging retaliation. 189 Likewise, charges filed with the EEOC alleging retaliation have doubled in the past decade. 90 In 1990, 7,579
charges of retaliation were filed with the EEOC. 19' By 2003, over 20,000
charges of retaliation were filed. 192 Moreover, the EEOC recently renow constitute 25% of the charges curported that retaliation complaints
93
rently before the Commission.1
Courts vary in their application of the prohibition against retalia-

tion. Some courts only consider adverse employment decisions to be actionable, such as termination or transfer, 194 whereas other courts will

find illegal retaliation upon a finding of less severe retaliatory conduct,
such as harassment, threats or unfavorable evaluations. 95 The protection
against adverse employment action taken in retaliation extends to employees or former employees who file a charge or suit against his or her
employer, 96 employees who testify in a Title VII proceeding or hearing,1 97 and employees who assist in the investigation of a Title VII

189. Section 704(a) makes it illegal for an employer "to discriminate against any [of his applicants or employees] ... because [that person] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this [Act], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this [Act]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(2000).
190. CHARGE STATISTICS, 1992-2003, supra note 8.
191.

EEOC TWENTY-FIFTH ANN. REP. supra note 172.

192. CHARGE STATISTICS, 1992-2003, supra note 8. According to that EEOC report, exactly
22,690 charges of retaliation were filed in 2003. Id.
193. BARRY GURYAN ET AL., Retaliation: The New Vogue in Employment Litigation: Don't
Get Mad. Don't Get Even. Just be Savvy., ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 879 (2004).
194. See Munday v. Waste Mgmt. of N. Am., Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding
that management's instruction to employees to shun co-worker who filed a sexual harassment
charge did not constitute illegal retaliation).
195. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455-56 (11th Cir. 1998)
(finding retaliation discrimination because Ms. Wideman received a pay cut, was refused a promotion even though she was qualified for the position and was subjected to negative statements because she filed an EEOC claim); Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 990 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that forging an employee's bonus check constitutes an adverse action).
196. See, e.g., Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 339, 346 (1997) (holding that a former
employee who filed a charge of discrimination on the basis of race could bring a retaliation suit
when the former employer later provided a negative job reference).
197. See, e.g., Glover v. S. Carolina Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 1999)
(finding that a "[a] straightforward reading of [Section 704's] unrestrictive language leads inexorably to the conclusion that all testimony in a Title VII proceeding is protected against punitive employer action").
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charge of discrimination.' 9 8 Employees may also be protected for engag-

ing in protest activities, but not to the extent that the protest qualifies for
insubordination or disruptive behavior at work.1 99 An employee who refuses to participate in a discriminatory act may also be protected.2 °°
The numbers of retaliation charges filed with the EEOC are likely

to continue increasing:
Employees who engage in these protected activities create an almost
inherently antagonistic relationship with their employer. The employee
will naturally tend to construe any subsequent adverse employment action as being retaliatory. And sometimes it is easy for lower level supervisors to react negatively
with what they regard as
,- ,. • when
.. confronted
201
a meritless claim of discrimination.

In fact, in many cases, a plaintiffs claim of discrimination will be
dismissed, but the employer will still be found guilty of retaliation.20 2

Therefore, even if the substantive claims of discrimination lack merit,
employers must remain cautious when employees are engaging in protected activities. Because this is an increasingly popular Title VII claim,
it is likely that the courts will further refine concepts of actionable re-

taliation in the years to come.

198. See, e.g., Miller v. Washington Workplace, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 2d 364, 376 (E.D. Va.
2004) ("[A]n employer may not retaliate against an employee for participating in an ongoing investigation or proceeding under Title VII."); but cf EEOC v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171,
1174 (11 th Cir. 2000) (declining to extend the protections of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision to
an employee who participated in an internal, in-house investigation when that investigation was not
linked to an EEOC investigation).
199. See, e.g., Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2000). The Matima court found that:
The law protects employees ...in the making of informal protests of discrimination, 'including making complaints to management, writing critical letters to customers, protesting against discrimination by industry or society in general, and expressing support of
co-workers who have filed formal charges.' . . . [But Title VII] 'does not constitute a license for employees to engage in physical violence in order to protest discrimination.'
Id. at 78-79 (internal citations omitted).
200. See, e.g., EEOC v. HBE Corp., 135 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 1998). The HBE case involved a
situation where "[h]otel officials intentionally discriminated against [the employee] and discharged
him because of his race and then discharged [the personnel director] for objecting to that decision as
illegal." Id. at 556. The HBE court found that Title VII's anti-retaliation provision protected the
manager who refused to carry out a racially motivated termination of another employee. See id.
("Deliberately restricting the opportunities of individuals on the basis of their race and punishing
others for opposing that policy violates the law. Such action is misconduct that should be deterred
and punished.").
201.
THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 157 (2001).
202. Id.
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CENTURY:

STATISTICS: WHERE ARE WE TODAY?

Although sex-based wage discrimination has been illegal since
1963 (with the passage of the Equal Pay Act), a wage gap still exists in
all forms and levels of employment. 20 3 "In May 2000, the Census Bureau
released data showing that in 1998, the median earnings for women age
25 or older who worked full time, year round, were just $26,711, while
their male counterparts' median earnings were $36,679. "2o4 African
American men faced a 75% wage gap compared to white men in
1998.205 African American women, Hispanic men and Hispanic women
each had 63, 62, and 53% wage gaps, respectively, when compared to
white men. 0 6 The wage disparity extends to the highest corporate offices; "the 9.4 million men who hold full-time executive, administrative
or managerial positions earned $17,000 more than the 7.1 million
women at the same level." 207 In addition, "because women senior executives are still the exception rather than the rule, corporate leaders like
Heidi Miller at priceline.com and Betsy Holden at Kraft Foods make
headlines just by getting top jobs. 20 8 Perhaps most notably, jobs that are
predominantly held by women are frequently undervalued. 20 9 "Gas station attendants, for example, earn more on average than child care work210
ers."
Minority and female representation at the top levels of corporate
management has improved, but not by much. As of March 31, 1999, a
study by Catalyst revealed that women comprised only 11.9% of corporate officers in the nation's 500 largest companies.211 "In 1999, women
held just 11.1% of Fortune 500 board seats. Eight-four percent of For203.

See Lichtman, The Glass Ceiling: Lifted or Shattered?, EEOC STORY, supra note 20, at

18.
204. See id. In 1963, the year the Equal Pay Act became law, women earned fifty-nine cents
for every dollar earned by a male counterpart. Id. By 1998, women were still carning only seventythree cents per dollar. Id.
205. See id.
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. Id. Some argue "that the wage gap results not from discrimination, but rather from
women's choice to move in and out of a workforce to care for children and other family members."
Id. Others, such as the Independent Women's Forum, "often claim that women themselves perpetuate the wage gap by simply choosing to take jobs with lower pay, less pressure, and fewer opportunities for advancement." Id.
209. Id. at 18-19.
210. Id.at 19.
211. Id. at18. Note that this
was a 37% increase since 1995. Id.
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tune 500 companies had at least one woman director, but just 39 percent
had two or more. 212
The Future Workforce
The U.S. population is becoming larger and more diverse. One
study estimated that the population of the U.S. will grow to approximately 394 million people in 2050, an increase largely attributable to
immigration.21 3 If that estimate is correct, the population of this country
will have doubled in just over fifty years.214
According to 1995-2005 census projections studying growth
trends, the Asian population in this country is predicted to grow the fastest, followed by the Hispanic population. 1 5 Another census study predicted that "[b]y 2050, 75 percent of the population would be White; 15
percent Black; 1 percent American Indian, Eskimo and Aleut; and 9 percent Asian and Pacific Islander., 21 6 The white, non-hispanic 21 7 population of this country is predicted to be the slowest growing group. 21 8 "The
Hispanic-origin population would increase to 25 percent, and the nonHispanic White population would decline to 53 percent" of the population group classified as "White., 21 9 The study further predicted that

212. Id. Although fewer charges of discrimination have been filed with the EEOC against
large corporations as they "make diversity part of business and not just compliance," more than half
of the nearly 80,000 discrimination charges the agency receives annually are against small and midsized companies. Nancy Montwieler, Dominguez Lauds FederalContractorsas 'Pivotal' in Attaining EEO, Diversity Goals, 155 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), B-I (2004), available at
http://www.pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/dlr.nsf/is/a0a9j3m4y8.
213. JENNIFER CHEESEMAN DAY, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, PUB. NO. 25-1130, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION PROJECTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES BY AGE, SEX, RACE,

AND
HISPANIC
ORIGIN:
1995
TO
2050,
at
5
(1996),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/l/pop/p25-1130/p251130a.pdf. Day writes that "[tihe U.S. population
is projected to top 300 million shortly after 2010, 350 million around 2030, and approach 400 million by 2050 .
Id. at 7.
I...
214. Approximately 263 million people lived in the U.S. in 1995. See id. at 5.
215. Montwieler, supra note 212.
216. DAY, supra note 213, at 13.
217. One court defined "'Hispanic' [as] all persons designating themselves to be of Mexican,
Puerto Rican, Cuban, Latin American or Spanish descent." Ulloa v. City of Philadelphia, 95 F.R.D.
109, 113 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
218. See PAUL R. CAMPBELL, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, POPULATION DIVISION, PUB.
NO. PPL-47, POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR STATES BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN:
1995
TO
2025,
at
1
(1996),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/pp47.html.
219. DAY, supranote213, at 13.
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"[aidditional increases in the total White population after 2034 would be
due entirely to growth in the number of White Hispanics. 220
The growing Hispanic population in this country will likely pose
future employment challenges. 22 Thus, although issues of race have historically involved African Americans, the increasing number of Hispanic
immigrants promises a shift in the nature of employment discrimination
charges filed.
"English-only" rules are frequently cited example of discriminatory
practices disfavoring Hispanic immigrants. 222 To address the issue, in
2002, the EEOC issued guidelines warning employers that English-only
policies must be carefully tailored to specific job requirements.22 3 The
EEOC believed that "such rules are rarely justified based on workplace
requirements and there is a concern that they have a chilling effect on
workforce diversity. Non-English speakers might feel inferior, isolated
and intimidated
if forced to speak only English where it is not based on
4

job need.,

22

As the U.S. population shifts, employment trends will likely shift as
well. For example, "[i]f there is deep-seated ethnic segregation, it clearly
extends to the American workplace., 225 The California labor market evidences the current presence of "ethnic niches" in that State's workforce.226 There, "Mexican immigrants are employed overwhelmingly as
gardeners and domestics, in apparel and furniture manufacturing, and as
cooks and food preparers. Koreans open small businesses. Filipinos be220. Id. at 14. Another study noted that Whites are currently the minority in Hawaii and New
Mexico, while the states of California, Nevada, Texas, Maryland and New Jersey "are also predicted to become 'majority minority' states, entities where no one ethnic group remains the majority." Booth, supra note 187.
221.
Currently, Hispanic men and women occupy the lowest-paying jobs and face the largest
wage gaps (compared to white male workers). See EEOC STORY, supra note 20, at 18. Some suggest that the recent immigration of Hispanics explains their high level of poverty. See, e.g., NEWS
BATCH, supra note 76. ("The substantially lower wage rate reflects the high proportion of Hispanics
who are immigrants in entry level and agricultural jobs.").
222.
One commentator noted that "[w]ith large numbers of immigrants arriving from Latin
America, and segregating in barrios, there is also evidence of lingering language problems." Booth,
supra note 187. The issue, of course, is not unique to Hispanics. See Judy Olian, English-Only Rule
May Discriminate: Firms Must Taylor Job to Guideline, Not Require Exclusivity, THE DETROIT
NEWS, Apr. 9, 2003, available at http://www.detnews.com/2003/business/0304/09/fD4-132176.
"Between 1990 and 2000, census data show that the proportion of Americans with a primary language other than English rose from 14 percent to 20 percent." Id.
223.
Id.
224.
Id. ("Shared language is often essential to worker collaboration, team building, smooth
operations, and customer service. In some cases, language difficulties or differences impair performance or safety.").
225.
Booth, supra note 187.
226.
See id.
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come nurses and medical technicians. African Americans work in government jobs, an important niche that is increasingly being challenged
by Hispanics who want in. '2 27 But the segregation in the labor market
does not necessarily result from discriminatory hiring practices. "Because jobs are often a matter of whom one knows, the niches [are] enduring and remarkably resistant to outsiders. 2 28
Many employers are becoming increasingly prepared to deal with
the issues involved in an increasingly diverse workforce.
[W]e've come a long way since the [EEOC] came into existence. And
what I've noticed, particularly is how its influenced the attitude of
more progressive employers, that they seek to be recognized for their
diversity practices and they recognize that this is good business, so I
think changing attitudes by that kind of a positive effort is going to be
more effective in the long run than the remedial action of having to
bring lawsuits ... [.] [B]ut for me the most positive achievement is

that when I talk to some of the best companies in the country today,
they re [sic] very proud of their record on diversity and they make that
a core value of their work environment and they ve [sic] learned that
its good business .... 229
This statement reflects the growing perception that workplace diversity is not just legally correct or morally correct, but also serves to
enhance the overall quality of the workforce.
Allegations of Employment Discriminationand
Their Impact on the FederalCourt System
The Federal Courts are becoming increasingly burdened by charges
of employment discrimination. "The rate at which new fair employment
cases are being filed in Federal court has increased steadily since the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, now seems to be leveling off,
but is nonetheless an increasing proportion of the workload of the Federal courts. 2 30 For example, in 1998, a total of 252,994 new civil cases

227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229. Interview with Horace Deets, Executive Director, American Association of Retired Persons, EEOC 2000 Oral History Project, at http://www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/35th/voices/deets.html
(n.d.) [hereinafter Horace Deets].
230. RICHARD T. SEYMOUR, AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, TRENDS
available at
LAW,
at
I
(Mar.
24,
1999),
IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
http://www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/eeo/99/eeo09.pdf.
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were filed in Federal courts.2 3 ' New civil cases alleging employment
discrimination comprised one out of every 10.8 civil filings, or 9.2% of
all new civil filings in Federal court. 232 "Federal-question EEO cases are
14.4% of all Federal-question cases, or one in every 6.9 cases. Only
prisoner petitions are a larger proportion of civil or Federal-question filings. 77233
The following are the number of employment discrimination cases
filed across the country in federal court:
12 Months Preceding
June 30 of
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992 (12 mos. to 9/30/92)
1993 (12 mos. to 12/31/93)
1994 (12 mos. to 9/30/94)
1995 (12 mos. to 9/30/95)
1996 (12 mos. to 12/31/96)
1997 (12 mos. to 12/31/97)
1998 (12 mos. to 12/31/98)

Number of Employment
Discrimination Cases Filed
8,563
8,993
8,413
8,140
10,771
13,650
15,965
19,059
23,037
24,174
23,299234

In recent decades, employment discrimination case law reveals a
trend. Many of the more recent decisions address the anti-discrimination
policies and discrimination reporting procedures adopted by employers. 235 Procedures and policies that follow guidelines set forth by the
courts may provide employers an affirmative defense against charges of
231.
Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. The two cases that led this trend are Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)
and Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998):
In Ellerth and Faragher,the Court changed the landscape of harassment law, holding

that employers are strictly liable under Title VII when supervisors demand sexual favors
in return for obtaining improvements, or avoiding significant detriments, in their em-

ployment, if the supervisor backs up his or her threat by taking some action that only the
employer can take. All other harassment by supervisors with direct (or successively
higher) authority over the plaintiff is to be analyzed as a hostile-environment case in
which employers are automatically liable for actionable conduct unless they establish an
affirmative defense.
SEYMOUR, supra note 230, at 43.
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discrimination.2 36 The courts are not providing employers with an easy

"out" in cases involving employment discrimination, but instead seek to

VII, which are to prevent, rather
best further the objectives behind Title
237
discrimination:
remedy
than simply
First,the Court clearly wants to get rid of cases in which there was not
much offensive conduct, and reserve Title VII for cases in which the
conduct is sufficiently extreme to affect the terms and conditions of
employment. Second, the Court wants employers to have the strongest
possible incentive-avoiding strict liability-to eliminate supervisory
quid pro quo harassment. Third, the Court is giving employers the
strongest possible incentive for developing, implementing, and communicating an internal system for preventing supervisory harassment
and curing any violations of the policy. Fourth, the Court is giving applicants and employees the strongest possible incentive to use the ememployers
ployer's internal complaint procedure, as a means of lettinj
23
know of problems early so that they can be stopped early.
Beginning in the 1990s and continuing into the present, federal
courts have focused on refining the parameters of "adequate" antidiscrimination policies and reporting procedures required for an affirmative defense to be available to the employer. 239 For example, recent court
cases have addressed effective communication of anti-discrimination

One source offered the following "practice suggestion" for employers:
236.
The reasonableness of the plaintiffs failure to complain will be pivotal in many cases.
An employer will be in a much better situation to defend itself if it has taken active
measures to make it easy for employees to complain, to ensure that all complaints are
logged in and that higher-level officials routinely check to ensure that they are handled
promptly and thoroughly, to ensure that there will be no retaliation against complainants
for making a good-faith complaint, to ensure that no information about the complaint or
the complainant will be disseminated except as necessary to investigate the complaint
and take any necessary remedial action, to ensure safeguards adequate to guarantee that
the employer's policy is followed as rigorously for key managers as for other employees,
and to ensure that these safeguards are communicated in advance to all employees. The
more managers do to communicate-by example as well as by word-the message that
harassing behavior is taken seriously, the stronger a defense the employer will have.
Id. at 44.
237. See, e.g., Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 12 F. Supp. 2d 870, 880-84 (N.D. Ind. 1998)
("[Tihe primary objective of Title VII is not to provide redress for harassed employees, but to avoid
the harm in the first place.... Thus, the affirmative defense requires employers to prove that they
exercised reasonable care not only to promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, but also to
prevent such behavior from occurring.").
238. SEYMOUR, supra note 230, at 48.
239. Lancaster v. Sheffler Enters., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003-04 (W.D. Mo. 1998); Nuri v.
PRC, Inc., 13 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1305-08 (M.D. Ala. 1998).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

39

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 10
666

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

policies to employees,

240

[Vol. 22:627

'finding specifically that merely requiring an

employee to sign an anti-discrimination policy does not constitute reasonable care. 24 1 Federal courts have also focused on the employees' reasonableness in failing to utilize internal reporting procedures,242 while

scrutinizing the adequacy of the employer's response to discrimination
complaints.2 43
240. See, e.g., Nuri, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 1305-08. In Nuri, the court found that although the defendant-employer had an anti-discrimination policy in place, the defendant had not adequately
communicated the terms of this policy to its employees and was therefore not entitled to an affirmative defense. Id. at 1305. "Because having its employees be aware of the policy is so crucial to having a policy that is effective, and based on the evidence presented at trial, it is seriously doubtful
that PRC could be said to have 'exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior."' Id. at 1308.
241. See, e.g., Lancaster, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (holding that the mere fact that employer had
a sexual harassment policy was insufficient to qualify for application of the affirmative defense
when there was little evidence that employer tried to prevent harassment). "Simply forcing all new
employees to sign a policy does not constitute 'reasonable care.' The employer must take reasonable
steps in preventing, correcting and enforcing the policy .... Reasonableness requires more than issuing a policy." Id.
242. See Coates v. Sundor Brands, Inc., 164 F.3d 1361, 1364-66 (11th Cir. 1999); Indest v.
Freeman Decorating Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 265 (5th Cir 1999); Sharp v. City of Houston, 164 F.3d
923, 931 (5th Cir. 1999); Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Hafford v. Seidner,
183 F.3d 506, 513 (6th Cir. 1999); Van Steenburgh v. The Rival Co., 171 F.3d 1155 (8th Cir. 1999),
1160; Phillips v. Taco Bell Corp., 156 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 1998); Webb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc. of N. Texas, P.A., 139 F.3d 532, 539 (5th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Tulsa Junior Coll., 164
F.3d 534, 541-42 (10th Cir. 1998); Sconce v. Tandy Corp., 9 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (W.D. Ky.
1998). In Greene, for example, the court held that the Navy had the burden of showing "not merely
that Greene inexcusably delayed reporting the alleged rape ... but that, as a matter of law, a reasonable person in Greene's place would have come forward early enough to prevent Clause's harassment from becoming 'severe or pervasive."' 164 F.2d at 675.
It is possible that, in the not too distant future, there will be a need for specialized labor courts to
accommodate the increasing numbers of employment discrimination charges filed. Statistics reveal
that employment discrimination claims comprise an increasing percentage of the already heavy federal court workload. We have already seen a trend toward using mediation and arbitration to resolve
disputes. Because employment discrimination claims show no signs of abatement, even with the use
of extrajudicial forms of dispute resolution, there may be a need to find alternate methods to alleviate the burden increasing numbers of employment discrimination cases place on our federal court
system.
243. See Wilson, 164 F.3d at 543; Montero v. AGCO Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1145 (E.D.
Cal. 1998); Marsicano v. Am. Soc'y of Safety Eng'rs, No. 91-C-7819, 1998 WL 603128, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Sept 4, 1998). For example, the Wilson court found the discrimination reporting procedures implemented by the employer to be inadequate:
In our view, the record supports a finding that the policy was deficient in several respects. We note in particular evidence that although the policy provides a mechanism for
bypassing a harassing supervisor by reporting the harassment to the Director of Personnel, the Director's office is located in a separate facility and is not accessible during the
evening or weekend hours when many employees and students are on the various campuses. In addition, while the final portion of the procedure does not provide that it is the
responsibility of supervisors to report "formal complaints" within their area of control to
the Director of Civil Rights, the policy does not define what constitutes a "formal com-
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The benefits of this trend are two-fold: (1) by providing employers
clear guidance on how to execute anti-discrimination policies and internally remedying potential discrimination through reporting procedures,
courts provide employers with a "recipe" to avoid discrimination litigation; and (2) the burdens on the federal court system will likely dissipate
when successfully implemented anti-discrimination policies and reporting programs are in place. Therefore, Title VII gives courts the power to
regulate workplace environments and the relationships between employees, but court opinions focusing on the internal policies and procedures
implemented by employers are a way to guide employers back toward
self-regulation. The courts will always be available to remedy discrimination, but only when an employer fails to adequately regulate their own
workplace environment. 2 "
CONCLUSION

We have come far. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Chair, Cari Dominguez, recently reported that charges against the
biggest corporations have decreased as they "make diversity part of
business and not just compliance.,, 245 But signs that the fight for equal
opportunity in the workplace is not over persist. 246 Moreover, concerns

have been expressed that the passions that once drove the civil rights
movement have ebbed, 247 which will translate into less active enforcement and achievement of equality in the workforce.
The significance of Title VII lies not just in the legislated mechanisms created to monitor discrimination in the workplace, but also in the
radical changes to the American work environment inspired by the policies underlying that legislation. Notwithstanding Title VII's successful
plaint" as opposed to an informal one. Nor does the policy provide instruction on the responsibilities, if any, of a supervisor who learns of an incident of harassment through informal means. Indeed, TJC contends neither the Campus Police Supervisor, Mr. Weber,
or his Assistant Supervisor, Mr. Read, had any obligation under its policy to report the
incident to the Director of Civil Rights because Ms. Wilson did not make a "formal
complaint" to the Campus Police.
164 F.3d at 541 (footnote omitted).
244. "According to some estimates, nine out of every ten companies now have sexual harassment policies." Lens, supra note 45, at 515 n.95 (citing CNN Morning News (CNN television
broadcast), June 26, 1998).
245. Montwieler, supra note 212.
246. See KATZ & KABAT, supra note 177.
247. See, e.g., Tom Perez, The Civil Rights Act 40 Years Later: Is the Glass HalfFull or Half
Empty? (July 2, 2004), at http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ80VF&b=106855
(Mr. Perez is a former attorney with the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department).
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modification of hiring, promotion, and termination practices of employers in this country, Title VII has also drastically shifted notions about
generally acceptable verses unacceptable conduct toward co-workers.248
Thus, in addition to modified workplace protocol has come an even
more radical shift: Title VII has not just changed the face of the American workforce, but the minds of that workforce as well.249 As we have

become a more culturally diverse society, we have also worked to develop cultural sensitivity.
Title VII mandated workplace integration forty years ago, but today's employers no longer resist integration. They self-police many of
their own employment practices and implement anti-discrimination and
equal employment hiring policies as a matter of course. Hiring statistics
from the past forty years evidence the positive effect of this trendminority representation and advancement in employment is consistently
improving. In addition, employers are becoming increasingly vigilant
about investigating and punishing incidents of discrimination. Title VII
may have provided employers with the initiative for internal change, but
a rather remarkable shift has occurred nonetheless. Diversity is now
viewed not simply as a way to avoid litigation, but more importantly, as
a means to improve the quality of the overall workforce. A diverse employment environment is now widely considered to be a positive asseta seemingly inconceivable perception just a short generation ago.
We still have far to go. This Article surveyed the progress made
towards eradicating employment practices discriminatorily predicated
upon the race, sex, religion or national origin of employees during the
past forty years. Unfortunately, the roots of discrimination run deep. Although this overview recounts significant victories toward securing
equal employment opportunities for Americans, this nation has endured
a long history of minority oppression. No simple cure exists to heal the
wounds of past discrimination. In the face of our historically pervasive
discriminatory practices, it is simply naive to assume that racial, ethnic,
gender and religious tolerance will prevail in less than one generation.
We are a diverse society, and that diversity must continue to be addressed. Every one of us comes with our own set of biases and prejudices based on the circumstances in which we have been raised. "Since
the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960[s], we have been struggling against the
perceptions and attitudes about Blacks and others of color forged during

248.
249.

Lens, supra note 45, at 513-14
Alfred W. Blumrosen & Ruth G. Blumrosen, IntentionalJob Discrimination-NewTools

for Our Oldest Problem, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 682 (2004).
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Similar perceptions
our long history of slavery and subordination.
persist today. We still have employment discrimination "because we are
a multiracial, multiethnic society determined to preserve those cultural
and ethnic identities., 251 In addition, a diverse society necessitates discrimination laws. As long as immutable differences exist among people
in this country, employment discrimination will likely exist as well. And
as the work environment improves for those minority groups that have
historically suffered oppression, it is important that we not become complacent toward the rights of other minorities groups in need of Title VII
protection.
A key component in the fight against discrimination is education.
The high-profile sexual harassment cases in the 1990s demonstrated the
remarkable impact that public awareness can have on the frequency with
which incidents of discrimination are reported. But fear of backlash remains. A recent article, for example, commented on the stigma still attached to coming forward with allegations of sexual harassment: "Although women today may have more support and legal recourse for
filing sexual harassment complaints than 30 years ago, they don't speak
up as often as one might expect because of a fear of losing their job and
other negative consequences, according to Kimberly Schneider, an assistant professor of psychology at Illinois State University., 252 Schneider
reports that many women remain silent out of fear of retaliation"[r]esearch indicates that less than 10 percent of women in an organization who say they have experienced harassment say they reported it or
talked to a supervisor. 2 53 The fact that the number of retaliation charges
filed with the EEOC has increased so dramatically in recent decades
suggests that these fears may be well-founded.
The increased number of discrimination charges filed with the
EEOC after the September 1 th terrorist attacks further exemplify the
consistent need to address issues of employment discrimination. External forces-wars and terrorist attacks being the most obvious exam250.

Id.

251.

EEOC STORY, supra note 20, at 13. The effect of immutable characteristics cannot be

denied. "When it is possible to tell from a distance that a person you see is of a different race, sex,
or ethnicity .. [l]ike with anything else that you see, the mind adjusts. Itnotes the difference and
assimilates and reacts according to the viewer's mind-set, the product of life experience and training." Id.
252.
253.

Philbin, supra note 150 (emphasis added).
Id. "[A] study into the link between organizational climate and reporting of sexual har-

assment she conducted in 1997 confirmed what Conrad and Ranger already knew. 'How seriously a
person feels they would be taken,' Schneider says, 'is a good predictor of whether or not an incident
will be reported."' Id.
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pies--continue to spur discriminatory animus in this country. Immediately after September 11th, the EEOC warned employers against taking
retaliatory actions against those of Middle Eastern descent or Islamic
faith. 4 The swift response of the EEOC provides an excellent example
of the federal commitment to continue monitoring potentially discriminatory employment practices. At the same time, however, anecdotes of
retaliatory actions taken against Middle Eastern and Islamic employees
after the attacks-regardless of the EEOC warning and the threat of
Title VII litigation--demonstrate that the ideals of workplace tolerance
have yet to be fully realized.
Today there are far fewer accounts of overtly discriminatory employment practices than forty years ago. This can be seen simply through
the reduced number of cases turning upon direct evidence of discrimination. Instead, circumstantial evidence is widely used to prove more subtle-or even unconscious-discriminatory employment practices. Much
of the past twenty years has been devoted to refining methods of proof
that are more suited to deal with the evolving nature of employment discrimination. In the upcoming years, the current tools that have operated
largely to eliminate the more overt forms of discrimination will truly be
tested, as issues involving more subtle forms of discrimination are certain to dominate Title VII jurisprudence.
Statistics reveal that the American workforce is becoming increasingly more diversified.2 55 This reality poses a very clear challenge towards securing a workforce of truly equal employment opportunities.
Part of the impetus for Title VII was to create employment environments
better able to accommodate and shift toward diversification.2 56 Thus, the
current challenge to the permanent relevancy of Title VII is not limited
to its ability to address the historically entrenched and pervasive employment discrimination concerns that arose during the 1960s. Instead,
the hope is that Title VII legislation provides an analytical and procedural framework that will stretch far into the future to deal with the new
challenges that will inevitably threaten to undermine our progress towards equality.

254.

Press Release, Sept. 14, 2001, supra note 178.

255.

REPORT ON AMERICAN WORKFORCE, supra note 188.

256.

Horace Deets, supra note 229.
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